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83 
Statutory Cosmetic Surgery: Misinterpretation of the 
Copyright Act’s Registration Requirement in Cosmetic 
Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the era of Internet-at-your-fingertips, cars can be registered 
within minutes online. Instead of mailing registration cards, new 
electronic products can be registered instantaneously through the 
Internet. University students can even register for classes at the mere 
click of a mouse. With such convenience, most people never consider 
at what point “registration” occurs—that is, whether cars, electronic 
products, and students are registered when the online forms are 
electronically submitted or when, milliseconds later, the servers 
respond by accepting the registration. 
However, in the context of copyright registration, this 
distinction matters. The Copyright Act permits copyright holders to 
initiate actions for infringement only after the copyright has been 
“registered” by the Copyright Office.1 Because the time between 
submitting an application and having the application acted on by the 
Copyright Office often runs more than six months,2 as opposed to 
the milliseconds in many other registration contexts, it is important 
for potential plaintiffs to know whether they can bring suit after 
submitting the application materials, or whether they must wait for 
the Copyright Office to act. Unfortunately, for some plaintiffs, 
waiting the more than six months for the Copyright Office to act 
places them beyond the statute of limitations, thus removing any 
possibility of recovering for infringement. 
In Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp,3 the Ninth 
Circuit addressed this very issue, which had already split circuit and 
district courts across the country. The court, by looking at not only 
the plain language of the Copyright Act but also the legislative 
purpose and broader context of the statute, held that the plaintiff’s 
copyright was “registered” at the time it submitted an application to 
 
 1. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006).  
 2. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-what.html# 
certificate (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
 3. 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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the Copyright Office, thus allowing the case to proceed on the 
merits. This Note disagrees with the Ninth Circuit, instead arguing 
that it was unnecessary for the court to analyze legislative purpose 
and the broader context of the statute because the plain language is 
clear that the Copyright Office must act on an application before it is 
registered. Thus, the court should have dismissed the claim because 
it was brought before the copyright was registered. 
This Note proceeds as follows. Part II details the facts and 
procedural history of Cosmetic Ideas. Before analyzing the court’s 
opinion in Part IV, Part III outlines the legal background—
including the current circuit split—leading up to the court’s 
decision. Part V then analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s decision, 
concluding that the court made significant errors in statutory 
construction in holding that a copyright is registered at the time the 
application is received by the Copyright Office. Part VI briefly 
concludes. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This dispute arose between two jewelry retailers: Cosmetic Ideas, 
Inc., doing business as Sweet Romance Jewelry Manufacturing 
(“Cosmetic”), and IAC/InterActiveCorp, the parent company of the 
ubiquitous Home Shopping Network (“HSN”). Cosmetic 
manufactures and retails costume jewelry designed by artist and 
historian Shelley B. Cooper and inspired by antique and vintage 
items.4 It sells its products through a variety of high-end jewelry 
retailers, such as Hearst Castle, Canterbury Cathedral, and Fortnum 
and Mason, as well as on its own website.5 HSN is a 24-hour-a-day 
basic cable shopping network reaching over 90 million homes and 
selling a broad range of products, including clothing, exercise 
equipment, food and cooking devices, and of course, jewelry.6 
In 1997, Cosmetic designed a piece of costume jewelry called 
the “Lady Caroline Lorgnette,” a pendant featuring an acrylic 
magnifying glass adorned with crystals to simulate jewels.7 Two years 
later, Cosmetic began to manufacture and sell copies of the Lady 
 
 4. SWEET ROMANCE JEWELRY, http://www.sweetromanceonline.com/AboutUs.asp 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
 5. See id. 
 6. See HSN, INC., http://www.hsni.com/?o=!BNCI0&cm_sp=Global*BN* 
CompanyInfo (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
 7. See Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 614. 
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Caroline Lorgnette through its distributors.8 Cosmetic claims that 
sometime between 2005 and 2008, HSN began “manufacturing and 
distributing copies of a ‘virtually identical’ necklace” to the Lady 
Caroline Lorgnette.9 
It was not until March 6, 2008 that Cosmetic submitted to the 
Copyright Office an application for registration of its copyright in 
the necklace, receiving confirmation of receipt of the application on 
March 12, 2008.10 On March 27, 2008, Cosmetic filed a complaint 
in the Central District of California for copyright infringement, 
alleging that HSN infringed Cosmetic’s copyright in the necklace by 
selling necklaces that were virtually identical.11 The Copyright Office 
eventually issued a certificate of registration, but not until sometime 
after Cosmetic had filed the complaint against HSN.12  
On June 2, 2008, HSN filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the court lacked such 
jurisdiction over the controversy because Cosmetic had not 
registered the copyright, as required by the Copyright Act, when it 
commenced the action in district court.13 The district court granted 
HSN’s motion on June 17, 2008, resulting in this appeal to the 
Ninth Circuit.14 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Under the power granted it by the Copyright Clause to regulate 
copyright protection,15 Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976 
(“the Act”) to “adopt[] a single system of federal statutory 
copyright.”16 This system replaced an “anachronistic, uncertain, 
impractical, and highly complicated dual system” that provided 
common law copyrights for unpublished works and Federal statutory 
copyrights for published works.17 Under this simplified federal 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 16. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 129 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5745.  
 17. Id. 
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system, copyright protection begins the moment an original work of 
authorship is “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”18 Thus, 
registration of a copyright is not necessary to obtain protection.19 
Nevertheless, to encourage copyright registration and thus a 
“robust federal register,”20 Congress predicated the ability to bring 
suit for copyright infringement on the work first being registered.21 
Accordingly, § 411(a) of the Act provides, “[N]o action for 
infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be 
instituted until . . . registration of the copyright claim has been made 
in accordance with this title.”22 In order to avoid the technicalities of 
previous copyright statutes, however, registration is “a relatively 
simple . . . process,”23 requiring only deposit of two copies of the 
work,24 an application for registration,25 and payment of a fee.26 
Courts, though, are split over what it means for copyright 
registration to have “been made” under § 411(a)—in other words, 
when a copyright is “registered.” Some courts hold, under the 
“application approach,” that a copyright is “registered” when all 
necessary materials are submitted to the Copyright Office.27 Other 
courts, under the “registration approach,” disagree and require the 
Copyright Office to have acted on the application—which can often 
take more than six months—before a party can institute an action for 
copyright infringement.28 
This debate first arose because many courts treated § 411(a)’s 
registration requirement as a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. For 
 
 18. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). Under previous copyright statutes, copyright protection 
was dependent on formalities such as notice, deposit, and registration. H.R. REP. NO. 94-
1476, at 147–50 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5763–66. 
 19. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (“Such registration is not a condition of copyright 
protection.”). 
 20. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 21. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). 
 22. Id. 
 23. La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1199 (10th 
Cir. 2005), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010). 
 24. 17 U.S.C. § 408(b). 
 25. Id. § 409. 
 26. Id. § 708. 
 27. E.g., Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003); 
Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386–87 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 28. E.g., La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1202–03; M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron 
Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1489 (11th Cir. 1990), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 
1243. 
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example, the Tenth Circuit in La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay 
Realtors Angel Fire29 endorsed the registration approach, upholding 
the dismissal of a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because 
it was filed before the Copyright Office acted on the plaintiff’s 
application for registration.30 The Supreme Court in Reed Elsevier, 
Inc. v. Muchnick,31 however, abrogated this and other cases, holding 
that although the “registration requirement is a precondition to 
filing a claim,” it “does not restrict a federal court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction.”32 
Although post-Reed Elsevier the registration requirement is not a 
jurisdictional bar, it remains part of an infringement claim. Thus, the 
debate between the application and registration approaches 
continues as courts must determine whether a plaintiff has satisfied 
all elements of an infringement claim when she has applied for 
registration but the Copyright Office has yet to act on the 
application. It is precisely this question that the Ninth Circuit faced 
in Cosmetic Ideas. 
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
In Cosmetic Ideas, the Ninth Circuit adopted the application 
approach and held that a copyrighted work is registered at the time 
the copyright holder’s application is received by the Copyright 
Office.33 To reach this conclusion, the court performed standard 
statutory interpretation techniques, beginning by analyzing the plain 
language of the statute, then looking at the language of the statute 
as a whole and concluding by considering the broader context and 
the purpose of the statute (including analyzing its legislative 
history).34 
Before addressing the merits of the arguments, the court began 
by noting that the Copyright Office had acted on Cosmetic’s 
application for registration and issued a certificate of registration for 
the contested necklace.35 Once a copyright is accepted for 
registration, the registration dates back to the day on which the 
 
 29. 416 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 30. Id. at 1208. 
 31. 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010). 
 32. Id. at 1241. 
 33. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 621 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 34. Id. at 616–18.  
 35. Id. at 616. 
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application, fee, and deposit are first made to the Copyright Office.36 
Thus, the issue of registration as a precondition to suit was moot 
because the controversy had ended. Nevertheless, the Court decided 
to address the issue because it was one “capable of repetition yet 
evading review.”37 Furthermore, the law across the country was 
murky and unsettled, and the Ninth Circuit wanted to weigh in.38 
The court began its statutory analysis by reviewing “the plain 
language of the statute.”39 As mentioned previously, the Copyright 
Act provides, inter alia: “[N]o action for infringement of the 
copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until 
preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made 
in accordance with this title.”40 However, the court found that the 
Act’s definition of “registration” was wholly unhelpful in 
interpreting the term.41 
Because the language of the statute was unhelpful in interpreting 
the term “registration,” the court continued by dissecting “the 
language of the statute as a whole to determine the intended 
meaning.”42 According to the court, “copyright registration is 
addressed in five consecutive sections: §§ 408 through 412.”43 The 
court conceded that two subsections, “§ 410(a) and portions of 
411(a), contain language that suggests that registration requires 
some affirmative steps to be taken by the Copyright Office.”44 For 
example, § 410(a) “places an active burden of examination and 
registration upon the Register, suggesting that registration is not 
accomplished by application alone.”45 
The court went on, though, to argue that “[o]ther sections of 
the Act . . . cast doubt on this interpretation.”46 For example, § 408 
“favors the application approach,” stating that a copyright owner 
“may obtain registration . . . by delivering to the Copyright Office” 
 
 36. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (2006). 
 37. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616 (internal quotations omitted). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). 
 41. Id. § 101 (“‘Registration’ . . . means a registration of a claim in the original or the 
renewed and extended term of copyright.”); Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616. 
 42. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616. 
 43. Id. at 617. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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an application.47 Additionally, § 411(a) favors the application 
approach because it permits a plaintiff to bring suit for infringement 
after it receives a rejection from the Copyright Office, so long as it 
serves notice on the Register of Copyrights.48 Other sections, such as 
§ 410(d), however, “could be read as supporting either the 
application or registration approach.”49 Thus, the court was “not 
persuaded that the plain language of the Act [as a whole] 
unequivocally support[ed] either the registration or application 
approach.”50 This ambiguity made it necessary to look beyond the 
plain language of the statute “to determine which approach better 
carrie[d] out the purpose of the statute.”51 
After looking to “‘the broader context of the statute as a whole’ 
and the purpose of the statute,”52 the Ninth Circuit ultimately 
concluded that “the application approach better fulfill[ed] 
Congress’s purpose of providing broad copyright protection while 
maintaining a robust federal register.”53 In coming to this 
conclusion, the court emphasized three policy reasons. “First, the 
application approach avoids unnecessary delay in copyright 
infringement litigation, which could permit an infringing party to 
continue to profit from its wrongful acts.”54 Second, “the application 
approach avoids delay without impairing the central goal of 
copyright registration,” that of maintaining a robust federal 
register.55 Last, in addition to inefficiency, the registration approach, 
in the “worst-case scenario,” is unfair because it causes a party to 
completely lose its ability to recover for infringement.56 
Above all, the court emphasized that the application approach 
“‘best effectuate[s] the interests of justice and promote[s] judicial 
economy.’”57 Because a copyright holder could ultimately bring a 
 
 47. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006). 
 48. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). 
 49. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (quoting United States v. Olander, 572 F.3d 764, 768 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
 53. Id. at 619. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 620.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. (quoting Int’l Kitchen Exhaust Cleaning Ass’n v. Power Washers of N. Am., 81 
F. Supp. 2d 70, 72 (D.D.C. 2000)). 
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suit for infringement regardless of whether the application is 
approved or rejected, it was a “needless formality” to have to wait 
until receiving notice of approval before initiating suit.58 Thus, 
because Cosmetic had satisfied the registration requirement by 
submitting a completed application to the Copyright Office a 
number of weeks before filing its complaint, § 411(a) did not bar its 
infringement claim.59 The case was to proceed on the merits.60 
V. ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Cosmetic Ideas misinterpreted the 
plain language of the statute. A proper reading reveals that a 
copyright holder satisfies § 411(a)’s registration requirement—thus 
allowing her to bring an infringement claim—at the time that her 
application for registration is acted on by the Copyright Office, not 
merely when it is received. In coming to the opposite conclusion, the 
Ninth Circuit created a “topsy-turvy”61 statutory scheme. Moreover, 
because the statute’s plain language is not ambiguous, the court 
erred by considering its purpose and broader context. Only the 
registration approach properly harmonizes all statutory language 
referring to registration, thereby creating a “coherent and 
consistent” statutory scheme.62 
A. The Plain Language of the Act 
Any exercise in statutory construction begins by analyzing the 
plain language of the statute.63 Section 411(a) provides, “[N]o 
action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work 
shall be instituted until . . . registration of the copyright claim has 
been made in accordance with this title.”64 Admittedly, this provision 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 620–22. 
 60. Id. at 622.  
 61. La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1204 (10th 
Cir. 2005), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010). 
 62. Id. at 1200 (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002)) (“If 
the statutory language is not ambiguous, and the ‘statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,’ 
our inquiry ends.”).  
 63. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616 (citing K&N Eng’g, Inc. v. Bulat, 510 F.3d 1079, 
1081 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 64. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006). 
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alone provides little guidance on what constitutes “registration” or at 
what point a copyright is “registered.”65 However,  
[s]tatutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor. A provision that 
may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder 
of the statutory scheme—because the same terminology is used 
elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear, or because only 
one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that 
is compatible with the rest of the law.66  
Such is the case with the registration requirement. When read in 
conjunction with other statutory provisions addressing copyright 
registration,67 it becomes clear that registration is made under 
§ 411(a) when the Copyright Office approves the application. 
Furthermore, only this interpretation “produces a substantive effect 
that is compatible with the rest of the law”68—that is, only the 
registration approach creates a coherent statutory scheme where each 
provision is operative and terms are given consistent meanings 
throughout.  
The court in Cosmetic Ideas, however, did not properly consider 
the statutory scheme as a whole. First, in concluding “that the plain 
language of the Act [does not] unequivocally support[] either the 
registration or application approach,”69 the court misinterpreted 
statutory language clearly indicating that it is the Copyright Office, 
not the copyright holder, that registers a copyright. Second, by 
adopting the application approach, it interpreted the Act in a way 
that failed to give effect to every statutory provision and created an 
inconsistent statutory scheme. 
1. It is the Register of Copyrights and not the applicant that registers a 
copyright 
The court erred in concluding that the statute “suggests 
registration is accomplished by completing the process of submitting 
an application”70 because the Act makes it clear that it is the Register 
 
 65. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616–17. 
 66. United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 
(1988) (internal citation omitted). 
 67. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 408–12. 
 68. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 484 U.S. at 371. 
 69. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618. 
 70. Id. 
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of Copyrights, not the applicant, that actually registers a copyright.71 
The court focused its analysis on determining what it means to 
“register” a copyrighted work and when a copyrighted work is 
“registered.”72 It is more pertinent, however, to approach the issue 
by looking at who “registers”73 or “makes registration”74 of a 
copyright. Under this approach, because the statutory scheme 
confers the power to register a copyright exclusively on the 
Copyright Office, registration cannot be “made” under § 411(a) by 
an applicant’s actions alone. 
Section 410 provides the primary support for this interpretation 
of § 411(a): 
When, after examination, the Register of Copyrights determines 
that, in accordance with the provisions of this title, the material 
deposited constitutes copyrightable subject matter and that the 
other legal and formal requirements of this title have been met, the 
Register shall register the claim and issue to the applicant a 
certificate of registration under the seal of the Copyright Office.75 
The court conceded that § 410 “suggest[s] that registration is 
not accomplished by application alone”;76 however, this concession is 
insufficient. This statute does more than merely suggest that an 
application is insufficient for registration; it clearly and unequivocally 
places the sole power of registering copyrights on the Copyright 
Office. Because the Register is the one to register the copyright after 
examination, it follows that a copyright is not automatically 
registered upon an applicant’s unilateral action of submitting an 
application.77 
The court argued, however, that “[o]ther sections of the Act . . . 
cast doubt on this interpretation,” and thus the Act as a whole is 
 
 71. Strategy Source, Inc. v. Lee, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting Ryan v. 
Carl Corp., No. C 97-3873, 1998 WL 320817, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 1998)). 
 72. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617. 
 73. 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2006). 
 74. Id. § 411(a) (permitting an infringement action to be instituted when 
“registration . . . has been made”). 
 75. Id. § 410(a) (emphasis added). 
 76. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617. 
 77. Section 410(d) contains similar language: “The effective date of a copyright 
registration is the day on which an application, deposit, and fee, which are later determined by 
the Register of Copyrights . . . to be acceptable for registration, have all been received in the 
Copyright Office.” 17 U.S.C. § 410(d). 
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ambiguous.78 Perhaps its strongest argument as to the ambiguity of 
the plain language was § 408(a).79 Section 408(a) provides, “[T]he 
owner of copyright . . . may obtain registration of the copyright 
claim by delivering to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by 
this section, together with the application and fee . . . .”80 The Ninth 
Circuit argued that this provision “favors the application approach”81 
because it “implies that the sole requirement for obtaining 
registration is delivery of the appropriate documents and fee.”82 This 
is not the case, however. Upon closer analysis, both the language of 
this section and the inferences that can be drawn from the language 
Congress did not use are consistent with the registration approach 
and confirm that third party action is required to register a 
copyright. 
First, because § 408(a) contains the language “may obtain” 
instead of “shall obtain,” “[it] envisions substantive review of the 
material by the Register of Copyrights.”83 In statutory construction, 
the word “may” is generally a permissive term, as opposed to the 
mandatory term “shall.”84 For example, one court interpreted the 
phrase “each consumer who prevails may obtain . . . an order 
enjoining such acts or failure to act” to mean that it was within the 
discretion of the trial court to grant or deny injunctive relief.85 
Likewise, the phrase “may obtain registration . . . by delivering to 
the Copyright Office”86 implies that a copyright is not registered 
automatically upon submission but that registration is dependent on 
the discretion of the Copyright Office.87 This conclusion is bolstered 
 
 78. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617. 
 79. Id. 
 80. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (emphasis added). 
 81. Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 617. 
 82. Id. 
 83. La Resolana Architects, PA v. Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F.3d 1195, 1201 (10th 
Cir. 2005), abrogated by Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237 (2010); Corbis 
Corp. v. UGO Networks, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 520, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 84. Bennett v. Pan. Canal Co., 475 F.2d 1280, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also United 
States v. Rogers, 461 U.S. 677, 706 (1983) (“The word ‘may,’ when used in a statute, usually 
implies some degree of discretion. This common-sense principle of statutory construction is by 
no means invariable, however, . . . and can be defeated by indications of legislative intent to 
the contrary or by obvious inferences from the structure and purpose of the statute . . . .”). 
 85. David McDavid Pontiac, Inc. v. Nix, 681 S.W.2d 831, 839 (Tex. App. 1984) 
(emphasis added). 
 86. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 87. La Resolana Architects, 416 F.3d at 1201. 
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by the fact that in other portions of the Act Congress used the word 
“shall,”88 thus underscoring the fact that the terms “shall” and 
“may” have different meanings within this statutory scheme.89  
Second, Congress’s use of the phrase “obtain registration” 
instead of “register” in § 408(a) indicates that it did not intend the 
applicant to be the one to register copyrights. In the Act, the only 
time that Congress used the word “register” was in reference to the 
Register of Copyrights in § 410.90 Generally, where Congress uses 
specific language in one section but chooses to use different 
language in another section of the same Act, the meaning of the first 
language should not be read into the second.91 Accordingly, because 
Congress could have replaced the phrase “obtain registration” with 
the word “register,” “obtain registration” should not be interpreted 
to mean the applicant can unilaterally register a copyright. 
Congress was clear and consistent in stating that it is the 
Copyright Office, and not the applicant, who “registers” a copyright 
claim under § 411(a). Because the Act places the power to “register” 
a copyright exclusively on the Copyright Office, as evidenced by 
§§ 408(a) and 410(a), registration cannot be “made” under § 
411(a) until the Register approves the application. Thus, only the 
registration approach is consistent with the plain language of the 
statute. 
2. The court’s interpretation failed to give effect to every provision and 
created an inconsistent statutory scheme 
In construing the Act to support the application approach, the 
court in Cosmetic Ideas also committed errors by failing to give effect 
to every provision of the statute and creating an inconsistent 
statutory scheme. Only the registration approach provides a coherent 
interpretation of the Act where each provision is operative and terms 
have consistent meanings throughout. 
 
 88. 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (“[T]he Register shall register the claim and issue to the 
applicant a certificate . . . .”); id. § 410(b) (“[T]he Register shall refuse registration and shall 
notify the applicant in writing of the reasons for such refusal.”). 
 89. See Fed. Land Bank of Springfield v. Hansen, 113 F.2d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 1940). 
 90. 17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (“[T]he Register shall register the claim . . . .”). 
 91. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164, 176–77 (1994); see also Ariz. Elec. Power Coop. v. United States, 816 F.2d 1366, 
1375 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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In construing a statute, a court must strive to “give[] effect to 
every clause and word”92—that is, a statute should not be interpreted 
to render any word or phrase inoperative.93 In adopting the 
application approach, however, the Ninth Circuit ignored the 
statute’s clear differentiation between “application” and 
“registration.” Furthermore, by holding that a copyright is registered 
automatically upon application, the court rendered certain provisions 
of the Act inoperative.  
These errors are particularly evident in two provisions: §§ 411(a) 
and 410(d). In addition to the registration requirement, § 411(a) 
provides:  
In any case, however, where the deposit, application, and fee 
required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright 
Office in proper form and registration has been refused, the 
applicant is entitled to institute an action for infringement if notice 
thereof, with a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of 
Copyrights.94 
As a primary matter, “[b]ecause registration in this subsection is 
juxtaposed with the separate act of delivering the necessary 
application materials to the Copyright Office,” this language 
supports the proposition that mere delivery of an application is 
insufficient to register a copyright. 95 In other words, because the 
statute makes it clear that application and registration are two 
separate events, it follows that registration cannot occur upon 
application.96  
Furthermore, the application approach causes this provision to 
lose meaning in light of the rest of § 411(a). Assuming, arguendo, 
that the first clause of § 411(a) grants an applicant the right to 
initiate an infringement action upon delivering an application for 
copyright registration, it would be unnecessary for the subsequent 
clause to grant the same applicant the right to initiate an action for 
infringement when his or her application is refused. 
 
 92. Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 106 (1993) (quoting Moskal v. United States, 
498 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1990). 
 93. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985). 
 94. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (emphasis added). 
 95. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 96. See Mays & Assocs. Inc. v. Euler, 370 F. Supp. 2d 362, 368 (D. Md. 2005) (“In 
fact, the term application is used in the same section [as the term registration] and is clearly 
something separate and apart from registration.”). 
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More importantly, when interpreted according to the application 
approach, § 411(a) is unclear and ambiguous. As mentioned above, 
§ 411(a) provides that an applicant can bring a claim for 
infringement after registration is made or, if registration is refused, 
after serving notice on the Register of Copyrights.97 If interpreted 
based on the application approach, however, this section is unclear 
because it does not adequately address the scenario in which an 
applicant has already initiated a copyright infringement action but 
registration is subsequently refused. In this scenario, it is too late for 
the applicant to serve notice on the Register before instituting the 
action, thus leaving the applicant not knowing what to do with 
respect to serving notice on the Register.98 Under the registration 
approach, though, it is clear that an applicant cannot institute an 
infringement action until the Copyright Office acts on the 
application by either accepting or rejecting it, thus eliminating any 
lack of clarity in the statute.99 
The court also committed similar errors in construing § 410(d). 
Section 410(d) provides: 
The effective date of a copyright registration is the day on which an 
application, deposit, and fee, which are later determined by the 
Register of Copyrights or by a court of competent jurisdiction to 
be acceptable for registration, have all been received in the 
Copyright Office.100 
In addition to making it clear that registration occurs subsequent 
to application, thus further evidencing that the two acts are 
distinct,101 this provision loses meaning under the application 
approach. If it were true that the Act provided that a copyright is 
automatically registered when the materials are delivered to the 
Copyright Office, it would not be necessary for the copyright 
registration to be “back dated” to the date of application—the date 
of the registration would already be the date of delivery. Thus, the 
 
 97. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). 
 98. See Brush Creek Media, Inc. v. Boujaklian, No. C-02-3491 EDL, 2002 WL 
1906620, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2002). 
 99. Id. 
 100. 17 U.S.C. § 410(d). 
 101. Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612, 618 (9th Cir. 2010). 
(“However, because this back-dating does not occur until after the Copyright Office or a court 
has deemed the registration acceptable, the statute could be read to require action by the 
Register to effect registration.”). 
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most logical interpretation of this provision is that it accounts for the 
fact that registration is effected subsequent to delivery of the 
application. 
The net result of these errors is that the court in Cosmetic Ideas 
created a statutory scheme with inconsistent interpretations of the 
terms “registration” and “register.” In statutory construction, a term 
that appears throughout a statute ought to be given the same 
interpretation each time it appears.102 As discussed above, the only 
way to interpret “registration” in §§ 408(a) and 410(a) is to 
conclude that the Copyright Office “registers” a copyright after 
examining and approving the application. By concluding that a 
copyright is automatically registered in § 411(a) after mere 
application, the court interpreted “registration” differently than 
dictated by §§ 408 and 410, thus creating an inconsistent statutory 
scheme. Adopting the registration approach, however, aligns the 
concept of “registration” throughout the entire Act. Thus, when 
read as a whole, the plain language of the statute can support only 
the registration approach.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Unlike registering cars or electronic products, registering 
copyrights does not occur instantaneously. Accordingly, because the 
Copyright Act requires a copyright to be registered before the owner 
can bring suit for infringement, the question has arisen as to whether 
a copyright is registered for purposes of this registration requirement 
when it is acted upon by the Copyright Office or when it is merely 
received. In Cosmetic Ideas, the Ninth Circuit resolved this question 
by looking beyond the plain language of the Act to determine that 
the application approach best fulfilled Congress’s intent and the 
overall purpose of the Act. The court, however, erred in this 
conclusion. First, the court misinterpreted statutory language clearly 
indicating that it is the Copyright Office, not the copyright holder, 
that registers a copyright. Second, by adopting the application 
approach, it interpreted the Act in a way that failed to give effect to 
every statutory provision and created an inconsistent statutory 
scheme. Because the plain language of the statute was clear that the 
Copyright Office must act on an application before it is registered, it 
 
 102. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994). 
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was beyond the court’s purview to consider which method best 
effectuated Congress’s policy in enacting the statute. 
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